What Went Wrong
The post-election funk has a lot of people second-guessing the Democratic game plan and wringing their hands over Tuesday’s loss. But the loss was only catastrophic because of the all-or-nothing quality of the outcome. Loss of the Senate by one seat is, in terms of the next two years, as bad as losing by 20, and the way the House districts are drawn means that there are only a handful of competitive races in any given election cycle and little margin for error.
The fact is, the election really was incredibly close. Despite ruthless Republican tactics, better candidates in several races (Talent, Coleman, Dole, etc.), the mighty fatcat war chest, Bush’s barnstorming blitz, the horrible death of a leading Democrat in a key race, and the unique situation around September 11th, the country is still basically split 50/50. That the Dems even had a chance under these circumstances was pretty amazing, even given the historical record of mid-term election wins for the out-of-power party.
People are saying that the Democrats lost because they did not oppose the President forcefully enough. Perhaps, though what I think they really mean is that, since the D’s lost anyway, they might as well have at least gotten the satisfaction of saying what’s been on all of our minds. Fair enough, but I don’t think there’s a shred of evidence to suggest that that would have made the slightest difference in the outcome of the races that mattered. That’s because, disappointing as it may be to many of us, most Americans don’t vote on the basis of ideology. Top Republicans and at least one Democrat (Bill Clinton) seem to grasp this simple fact. The ideological clarity yearned for by a minority of interested people on both sides of the debate is not helpful, and is usually harmful, in hotly-contested elections.
Worse, to the extent that any ideology is popular, it is right-wing ideology. Because of this, the burden of proof always falls more heavily on the left to prove the value of its policies – especially in areas like national security. Even on “Democratic issues” like education and, increasingly, fiscal responsibility, Republicans need only waive their hands reassuringly over a pile of half-baked theories to obtain parity with painstakingly-reasoned and fiercely-argued Democratic positions. In the current climate, conservative policies need to fail conclusively (or beyond conclusively in the case of the economy) before the electorate is willing to consider alternatives proposed from the distrusted traditional left.
The inherent bias always makes it a steep uphill climb when the Democrats are out of power. Once they have lost the ability to control the agenda and demonstrate the effectiveness of their policies through proper administration, they are reduced to the role of critics of a status quo that enjoys an enormous presumption of favor. Most people prefer good news to bad. If the Republican government says the war on terror is going fine, and progress is being made in the economy, and corporate criminals are being dealt with, and our judges will enforce law and order, it forces the Democrats to say, “No, no, no!” Even if they follow up their criticism with constructive counter-proposals, they are still likely to be ignored until circumstances prove them right beyond any doubt whatsoever.
For this reason, the Clinton/McAuliffe approach of emphasizing “breakfast table issues” and soft-pedaling ideological differences remains a viable strategy. The problem is that the Democrats in 2002 were so hemmed in by Bush’s popularity and the national security environment that they could not raise their guns above the narrowest targets - prescription drug benefits and civil service protection for national security workers, for example. The pathetic result is that Democrats right now win elections by reassuring people that they will change only the very least bit that needs changing and nothing more. But it’s not lack of boldness: it’s a reflection of the mood of the electorate.
The sad fact is that a signal moment of triumph for liberalism between 1932-1974 has blinded most people to the truth that America has always been a fundamentally conservative country – hostile to government, tolerant of personal and corporate greed, intolerant of racial and lifestyle diversity, militaristic, self-righteous and eager to prosecute and punish others. Big-government liberalism, secular values and a broader notion of citizenship arose only because the catastrophe of the Great Depression left traditional conservatism momentarily bankrupt (literally as well as figuratively). The New Deal, Labor and Civil Rights movements created strong pockets of support for liberal policies, but, outside of a small cadre of ideological true-believers, the natural constituency in America for left-wing politics per se (as opposed to particular programs and initiatives) was and is very small.
Now the generation whose vigorous, effective and popular liberal ideology was shaped in the upheavals of the Great Depression and World War II (the great crusade against extreme right-wing fascism) is dying off and being replaced by ideologues with little practical experience (e.g., the academic, institutional and entertainment-industry left) and by constituents with a vested self-interest in the continuance of the welfare state. The politics that emerges from this left is neither vigorous nor effective, and it is spectacularly unpopular with a large portion of the American public.
In this moment of failure and reflection, it is tempting to turn to the self-appointed guardians of faded ideological glory to reclaim the “soul of the Party.” But the reality is that allowing these people to control the agenda is a recipe for disaster, both in policy and political terms. Would anyone care to argue that Cleland, Carnahan or Bowles would have won if they had run farther to the left? Or that Minnesota could have picked a more true-blue Democrat than Walter Mondale, who lost anyway? Chalk this one up to history, not ideology.
It’s impossible to build a popular progressive party from the top down. Let the Greens have their vanguard 2%. A winning Democratic party has to keep finding ways to put the practical concerns of most Americans at the center of their program and articulate real solutions in a meaningful, visionary way, as Bill Clinton did. Compromise? Sure. Because the next two years are going to show that winning through small compromises turns out to be a whole lot better than being completely compromised by defeat.
2:45:49 PM 
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